UIC Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 4

Article 7

Summer 1998

Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to
the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 1351 (1998)
Mary E. Spring

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the
State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary E. Spring, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the Problem of Juvenile
Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1351 (1998)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/7
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE
PROSECUTION: A NEW APPROACH TO
THE PROBLEM OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY IN ILLINOIS
MARY E. SPRING*

INTRODUCTION
Fifteen-year-old Laura1 sat dazed in the police station. "But I
didn't kill anybody!" she pleaded. It made no difference,' they told
her. Earlier in the evening she went out with her eighteen-yearold boyfriend, Paul, and his friend Jack. Paul and Jack, low on
money and bored with just "hanging out," decided to hold up the
convenience store down the block. Laura had never done anything
like that before. She was a good girl, "the girl next door." Paul
convinced her, though, that they were only going to take a few
dollars and no one would get hurt. However, during the hold-up,
Jack mistook Paul for a guard and shot him. Laura dragged Paul
to the car and rushed him to the hospital; he later died. Laura
could not believe it when a lawyer told her she would be tried as
an adult for Paul's murder. Under Illinois law, no other option
exists.3
Across the room sat Frank. His thirteen-year-old frame
slouched casually in the chair. "Can I go now?"' he demanded.
Around the same time Laura was rushing Paul to the hospital,
Frank was beating a rival gang member in the head with a
baseball bat. Frank then stole his jacket. Frank had been here
* J.D. Candidate, June 1999.
1. The hypotheticals in this Comment are loosely based on actual children
whom Edward Humes discusses in his recent book. EDWARD HUMES, No
MATTER How LOUD I SHOUT 10-15 (1996). While the author has changed
names and genders of the juveniles and the specifics of the crimes, Hume's
work has provided the inspiration for these scenarios. Id. This book provides
a jolting look at those who are struggling to make a failing juvenile system
work. Id.
2. See People v. Graham, 477 N.E.2d 1342, 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that the felony murder rule applies when a co-felon kills another cofelon during the commission of the felony).
3. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996) (requiring minors aged 15 and
older whom the state alleges committed murder to face prosecution as adults).
4. See HUMES, supra note 1, at 14-15 (quoting the real-life child on whom
Frank is based as saying, "Can I go home now?").
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before; he knew the routine. He also knew there was little the
authorities would do to him. They might place him in detention
for a year or two, but then he would be back out. "Can I go now or
what?" he asked in a mildly annoyed voice.
Juvenile delinquency' is a problem that has faced countless
generations,' but recently it has taken on increasingly violent and
epidemic proportions.7 A tragic reminder of this violence occurred
this past March when a thirteen-year-old boy and his eleven-yearold friend sprayed their Jonesboro, Arkansas, schoolyard with
gunfire, killing four children, one teacher and wounding ten
others.! A more common symptom of the problem is illustrated by
the recent school locker-room assault conducted by three fifteenyear-olds upon another fifteen-year-old in a suburb of Chicago.9
In this centennial year of the Illinois juvenile justice system,' °
it is appropriate and necessary to review how the system treats
children like Frank and Laura. Frank represents many of the
juvenile system's toughest "clientele."" He has little incentive to
5. Black's defines juvenile delinquency as: "Participation in illegal
behavior by a minor who falls under a statutory age limit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 867 (6th ed. 1990). Illinois utilizes the term "delinquent minor"
to describe a child whom the juvenile court finds delinquent. 705 ILCS 405/53(1) (West 1996). A delinquent minor is statutorily defined as "any minor who
prior to his seventeenth birthday has violated or attempted to violate,
regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or state law or municipal
ordinance." Id. Like Illinois, seven additional states statutorily set the
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at 16. HOWARD N. SNYDER &
MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT

73 (1995) (listing Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
South Carolina, and Texas with Illinois). Connecticut, New York, and North
Carolina set the maximum age at 15. Id. The remaining 39 states and the
District of Columbia set the maximum age at 17. Id. Most states, however,
allow a juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over a minor adjudicated
delinquent until age 20 for purposes of appropriately sanctioning the
individual. Id. Massachusetts and Texas take an even firmer approach,
allowing jurisdiction over a delinquent minor to be extended for "disposition
purposes" until ages 36 and 56, respectively. Id.
6. See

Simon Dinitz, Foreward to CLEMENS

BARTOLLAS,

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY vii, (1985) (noting the observations of Socrates and Aristotle
decrying the disobedient youths of their day).
7. An Epidemic of Juvenile Crime, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1994, at 18. Teens
are responsible for almost 20% of violent crimes. Richard Lacayo, Teen Crime:
Congress Wants to Crack Down on Juvenile Offenders, But Is Throwing Teens
Into Adult Courts - And Adult Prisons- the Best Way?, TIME, July 21, 1997, at

26. Between 1985 and 1995, the juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes
increased 67%. Id.
8. Corky Siemaszko, Arkansas Suspect Mom: Tried to Scare 'Em, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 6, 1998, at 18.

9. Karen Cullotta Krause, Prospect High Players Now Face Felony
Charges, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1998, at 1 Sec.2.
10. See ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (creating the

juvenile court system in Illinois).
11. See HUMES, supra note 1, at 15 for a description of children like Frank
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reform: the juvenile justice system is a revolving door to him."2 His
arrest and juvenile court adjudication will have little effect on the
juvenile crime rate. Frank is lost.
Laura is also lost. She will face many years, even life, in
prison because Illinois law allows no other alternative.' 3 The state
transfers many other children like her to criminal court based only
on their age and offense.14 The juvenile justice system cannot
rehabilitate many of them: they are too far gone. 5 However,
others, like Laura, are still very amenable to treatment, if only the
state offered it to them. 16 Locking these children up and "throwing
away the key" is not going to solve the problem of juvenile

delinquency. 17
What may solve the problem is a new hybrid form of
jurisdiction called extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution
(EJJP). Under EJJP, a child offender receives both a juvenile
disposition and an adult criminal sentence that is stayed pending
the child's successful completion of the juvenile rehabilitative
program.'8 The Illinois General Assembly has recently passed a
version of EJJP. 9 This Comment proposes an alternative version
that provides more flexibility and broader utilization of EJJP in
Illinois.
Part I of this Comment discusses juvenile delinquency and
American society's efforts to solve the problem. Part II discusses
the problems inherent in the modern juvenile court system, the
problems associated with transferring children into the adult
criminal court system, and the effectiveness of EJJP. Finally, Part
III proposes model legislation for the utilization of EJJP in Illinois.

and the inability of the juvenile court system to effectively deal with them.
12. See Rita Kramer, The Juvenile Justice System Is Too Lenient, in YOUTH
VIOLENCE 212, 215 (Bruce Leone et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the lack of
consequences for juvenile offenders and the high recidivism rate among
juvenile offenders on parole).
13. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996) (requiring the state to
prosecute children aged 15 and older as adults under these circumstances).
14. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 154 (reporting an increased
use of statutorily imposed waiver based on the offense and the child's age).
15. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 215 (discussing the difficulty of
rehabilitating hardened offenders).
16. See HUMES, supra note 1, at 13-15 (describing a child similar to the
hypothical character Laura who could benefit from treatment in the juvenile
system but is barred due to transfer provisions).
17. See ROBERT C. ROWLAND, UNITED STATES POLICY ON REDUCING
JUVENILE CRIME 80 (1996) (explaining that preventing children living in
poverty from becoming criminals is one approach to decreasing juvenile
crime).
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997) (providing dual sentencing

under EJJP).
19. Ray Long & Mike Cetera, Philip Warns of Legislature Running Late,
CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1998, at B2.
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THE PROBLEM OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND AMERICA'S
TREATMENT OF CHILD OFFENDERS

Society's perception of children at any given time has greatly
influenced how it has treated juvenile justice."
Section A
examines the pre-twentieth century American treatment of child
offenders. Section B discusses the birth of the juvenile court and
its impact on delinquency. Section C examines the recent
utilization of transfer statutes to prosecute child offenders as
adults. Section D discusses the development and implementation
of EJJP.
A. Pre-Twentieth Century Treatment of Juvenile Offenders In
America
Early American law adopted the English common law
concerning a minor's criminal liability.' Children up to age seven
were irrebuttably presumed incapable of forming criminal intent
and therefore were immune from prosecution. 2 Children between
the ages of seven and fourteen enjoyed a rebuttable presumption
of immunity and could only face prosecution if uncontroverted
evidence demonstrated that they possessed criminal intent.3
Society held children aged fourteen and older criminally liable for
their transgressions."
Colonial America 2 embraced an uncomplicated view of
juvenile justice. 6 Society, looking through the lens of strict
Protestant religious doctrine, 7 believed man's inherent sinfulness
caused juvenile delinquency. 2" Thus, a favored treatment of
juvenile delinquency was "beating the devil" out of the offender.29
The family assumed the primary responsibility for meting out this

20. See

CLEMENS

BARTOLLAS,

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY

18-20

(1985)

(explaining the interrelationship between societal responses to juvenile
delinquency and the way society viewed children and the root causes of
delinquency).
21. MARGARET C. JASPER, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CHILDREN'S LAW 3
(1994).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For purposes of this Comment, the Colonial American period extends
from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century (from the
early Puritan settlements to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution).
26. BARTOLLAS, supra note 20, at 6.
27. CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: THE
INSTITUTIONAL PARADOX 4 (1976) [hereinafter JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION].

Calvinist beliefs focused on the degenerated condition of man and the
influence of Satan over him. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. This is a reflection of the Biblical admonition of spare the rod and
spoil the child. Proverbs 13:34.
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discipline, ° although the church and the community shared
responsibility for overseeing the family and for intervening in
serious cases.3 1 When family-imposed discipline failed to cure the
wayward child, the transgressor faced a myriad of harsh
punishments inflicted by the community. 2 These children could
expect to be publicly whipped, dunked, placed in stocks, banished,
or even executed3 3 if society held them to be criminally liable.'
This uncomplicated juvenile justice system persisted until
attitudes and social conditions35began to change with the onset of
industrialization in the 1820's.
With the Industrial Revolution came a need for child labor
that influenced the way society dealt with delinquency.36 The
state, rather than the parent, became the first line of discipline for
delinquent children. 7 Institutions known as "houses of refuge"
opened as places for punishment where detained children could be
inculcated with middle-class values.' Harsh conditions prevailed
as children suffered adult-style punishments39 and strict
Upon release, these children went to work as
regimens."0
The refuge house, not surprisingly, was
apprentices."'
unsuccessful 2 in stemming the growing tide of juvenile
delinquency.
During this period reformers offered an alternative to the
refuge house.4 Believing delinquency resulted from a deficient
environment rather than a deficient moral character, these
reformers created child-saving societies." These societies sent

30. JASPER, supra note 21, at 3. Early law made parental discipline of
children mandatory. Id. A parent's failure to discipline effectively often
meant removal of the child to a "better" family. Id. at 4.

31. Id. at 3.
32. BARTOLLAS, supra note 20, at 6.
33. Id. Connecticut law in 1650 went so far as to embrace the Old
Testament law in Exodus providing for capital punishment for children who
cursed or hit their mother or father. CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 16 (3d ed. 1991) (citing the Code of 1650, Being a

Compilation of the Earliest Laws and Orders of the General Court of
Connecticut). Mercifully, this punishment only extended to children aged 16
and older. Id.
34. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 16.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id.
37. BARTOLLAS, supra note 20, at 6.
38. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 19.
Punishments included ball and chain, bondage, solitary
39. Id.
confinement, and whipping. JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 5.
40. JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 5.
41. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 19.
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id.
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45
delinquent children out West and apprenticed them to farmers.
This system successfully reduced subsequent delinquency among
participants, but was nonetheless barraged with strong
opposition. 46 Refuge houses in the labor-hungry East did not
appreciate being deprived of a valuable source of child labor.47
State governments began administering reform schools by the
mid-nineteenth century. 48
These detention institutions were
concerned with providing formal training to delinquent children.49
However, the poor economy after the Civil War forced these
institutions to cut services and operate as little more than
warehouses."0
Reformers continued reacting to the exploitation of children
during the Industrial Revolution."' Led by feminist groups such as
the Hull House and the Chicago Women's Club, these reformers532
paved the way for the establishment of the juvenile court system.

B. The Juvenile Court System
On April 21, 1899, Illinois established the first official juvenile
court. 4 The Juvenile Court Act provided that all children under
sixteen years old whom the state alleged to be delinquent would
face adjudication 5" in a system separate from the adult criminal
court. 6 With the emphasis on "the child's need and not the deed,"
45. Id. These apprenticeships differed from refuge house apprenticeships
in that no binding agreements took place in these situations. Id.
46. Id.
47. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 22.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Bradner C. Riggs, The Juvenile Court In Illinois, 5 Juv. JUST. COMM.
NEWSL. 1 (May 1993).
52. One of these reformers, and also founder of the Hull House, is Jane
Addams. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 27. She believed that the exploitive
nature of the Industrial Revolution environment turned children (who were
inherently good) into delinquents. Id. at 27-28.
53. Riggs, supra note 51, at 1.
54. ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT, 1899 Ill. Laws 131; Riggs, supra note
51, at 1. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act provided that at least one Cook
County circuit judge would hear all cases arising under the gambit of the Act.
ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 § 3. It also provided that
the state must confine children separately from adults, and proscribed jailing
children younger than 12 years old. Id. §§ 9, 11. The Act authorized the new
juvenile court to appoint probation officers to investigate, represent the
interest of children before the court, inform the judge as needed, and
supervise those children on probation. Id. § 12.
55. Adjudication refers to a juvenile court's decision as to whether a youth
is delinquent. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 32. The trial process a child
experiences in juvenile court is the adjudicatory hearing. Id.
56. ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT 1899 Ill. Laws 131 § 3. The Act defined

delinquency as including any child under age 16 "who violates any law of this
State or any city or village ordinance." Id. § 1.
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the new court had no concern for issues of guilt or innocence, nor
did the court seek to punish wrongdoing.17 The promise of this
revolutionary system to cure the problem of delinquency through
treatment failed to fully materialize, however. 58 As juvenile crime
continued to increase, the juvenile system began to focus more on
control than on rehabilitation.59
Children in the system did not initially receive the legal
rights to due process that adults possessed in the criminal
system.60 In the juvenile system, proceedings were civil in nature;
hence, authorities did not believe the process due criminal

57. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 230. This paternalistic juvenile system
sprung from the doctrine of parens patriae, wherein the state assumed the
role of a caring parent charged with protecting delinquent children. Id. at 14,
228, 230. Parens patriae translates into "parent of the country." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Originating from English common law
with the king's right to assume the role of guardian over those with legal
disabilities, the state assumed responsibility to take care of individuals, such
as children, who are unable to provide for their own care. Id. The purpose
clause of the Juvenile Court Act states: "That the care, custody, and discipline
of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by
its parents ....

ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT 1899 Ill. Laws 131 § 21.

58. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 30.
59. Id. at 34-36. Juvenile courts differ widely in their organization and
their operation. Id. at 229. In Illinois, once police take a child into custody,
the police either give the child a station adjustment (they send the child home
or informally refer the child to a community social service), release the child
to his or her parents pending the filing of a petition, or hold the child in
custody pending the filing of a petition. 705 ILCS 405/5-6 (West 1996). If the
state does not file a petition, the child returns home and may receive a
referral to a community social service. 705 ILCS 405/5-12 (West 1996). If the
state files a petition, the state either releases the child to his or her parents
pending an adjudicatory hearing or detains the child pending the adjudicatory
hearing. 705 ILCS 405/5-8 (West 1996). If the state detains the child, the
juvenile court holds a detention hearing to determine whether probable cause
exists. 705 ILCS 405/5-10(1), 10(2) (West 1996). This hearing results in
either dismissal of the petition, release of the child from custody pending the
adjudicatory hearing, or continuance of the child in custody pending the
adjudicatory hearing due to a finding of immediate and urgent necessity. Id.
At the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court judge may find the child
delinquent or may find the child. not delinquent and dismiss the petition. 705
ILCS 405/5-20 (West 1996). The judge also has the option of ordering a
continuance under supervision. Id. If the judge finds that the child is
delinquent, the judge holds a dispositional hearing. Id. The judge can order
probation, residential placement, treatment for drug addiction, commitment
to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), detention
for 30 days, emancipation, or commitment to the Illinois Department of
Corrections (DOC). 705 ILCS 405/5-23 (West 1996).
60. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 256. For example, children did not have
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment
right to confront one's accusers, the right to a speedy trial, the right to
counsel, and the right to trial by jury. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
555 (1966); SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 256-57.
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proceedings was necessary.6' The juvenile court and the police had
a significant degree of discretion in dealing with delinquents.62
Unfortunately, while the system forced children to face
adjudication without due process, it was simultaneously failing to
deliver its promise of rehabilitation.6
The United States Supreme Court reacted to this dilemma
with a series of important decisions that altered the nature of the
juvenile court.' Through these decisions children in the system
gained the right to notice,65 the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine accusers,67 the
right against self-incrimination,' the right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before adjudication of delinquency69 and the right
against double jeopardy. 7 However, children did not gain the
right to trial by jury. 7' Although coming short of providing
children in the juvenile court the full panoply of procedural rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants, these decisions effectively
transformed the nature of the juvenile court from civil to quasicriminal.72
C. Treating Children as Adults - Transfer Into the Criminal
Court
During

the

1970's,

society's

attitude

towards

juvenile

61. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 256-57.
62. Id. at 35. For example, the state could have subjected a juvenile to
confinement in institutions and detention facilities for an indefinite period of
time until that juvenile reached majority and escaped the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Frank A. Orlando & Gary L. Crippen, The Rights of Children
and the Juvenile Court, in JUV. JUST. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 90 (Ira M. Schwartz
ed., 1992).
63. Orlando & Crippen, supra note 62, at 91.
Justice Abe Fortas
commented: "The child receive[s] the worst of both worlds ... he receive[s]
neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383

U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
64. See SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 256-63 (discussing the impact of
recent Supreme Court decisions on the nature of the juvenile court).
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). To comply with due process, the
state must give notice that details the charges and must provide this notice
well in advance of court proceedings so the minor has a reasonable time to
prepare a defense. Id.
66. Id. at 36. When a child faces a legal proceeding in which he or she is in
danger of losing his or her liberty, the child has a right to the "guiding hand of
counsel." Id.
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id. at 47. The Court expressed surprise at the thought that Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination could be available to
"hardened criminals" but not to minors. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
69. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
70. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
71. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 535-36 (1971).
72. SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 257.
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delinquency began changing. 3 While at the inception of the
juvenile court system children were involved in relatively minor
infractions such as shoplifting and burglary, children in the 1970's
began committing violent crimes with increasing frequency.74 In
response, states began changing the focus of their efforts in
dealing with youth crime from rehabilitation to punishment. 75 One
manifestation of this "get tough" approach was the creation in
every state of some mechanism for transferring some minors into
This
the criminal court to face adult criminal prosecution.7 '
Section examines the methods available in Illinois for transferring
children into the criminal court.
1.

DiscretionaryTransfer

Discretionary transfer is widely used as a method for
transferring children into adult court.77 This transfer provision
73. Mark Curriden, Hard Times for Bad Kids, 81 ABA J. 66, 67 (Feb. 1995).
74. Penelope Lemov, The Assault on Juvenile Justice, GOVERNING MAG.,
Dec. 1994, at 26-27. The violent crime arrest rate per 100,000 youth was:
1976 1977 1978 1979 19801981 1982 1983 198419851986 1987 1988198919901991 -

150.0
149.5
166.5
160.4
162.5
156.5
150.4
139.1
137.3
137.9
141.8
137.9
142.7
164.2
184.8
195.0

1992 -197.6
Id. at 28 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice statistics).
75. Id. at 27.
76. Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Criminology: The End of
the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. 449, 450
(1996). Some transfer provisions have been around for quite a while. SNYDER
& SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 85. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee have had
transfer mechanisms in place since 1920. Id. Delaware, Indiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Utah have allowed transfer since the 1940's. Id.
77. ILLINOIS JUD. CONF. STUDY COMM. ON Juv. JUST., JUVENILE LAW

BENCH3OOK 98 (1992)[hereinafter ILLINOIS JUD. CONF.]. As of 1995, all but
two states (Nebraska and New York) had discretionary transfer provisions.
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 85. Illinois adopted discretionary
transfer in 1973. Lisa M. Wortman, Does Transfer to Adult Court Work?
Recidivism and Juveniles Tried as Adults, JUV. JUST. COMM. NEWSL., Sept.
1995, at 1, 2.
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grants the juvenile court discretion to transfer jurisdiction over a
child to criminal court. 8 In making a transfer decision, the juvenile
court must first consider several factors, including the chance of
rehabilitating the child and the threat to society posed by the
child. 9

In Illinois, the state's attorney may move for discretionary
transfer if a child at least thirteen years old is alleged to have
committed any crime." In deciding whether to transfer the child
into criminal court to face prosecution as an adult, the juvenile
court must consider whether probable cause exists, whether the
alleged act involved premeditation and aggression, whether the
child's age and previous history warrant transfer, whether
adequate juvenile facilities exist for treating this child, whether
public safety and the child's best interests dictate that the child
needs to be detained past the age of minority, whether the minor
possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged
offense and whether the offense alleged is a felony under Section 5
of the Cannabis Control Act 8' committed on or near school
property. 2 Although the juvenile court must consider each of
these factors, 3 it may weigh each factor differently84 and may
grant transfer even if some factors do not weigh against the child.8
78. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizingthe Juvenile Court: A Research Agenda for
the 1990's, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 59, 66 (Ira M. Schwartz

ed., 1992).
79. Id. The Supreme Court enumerated these factors in Kent: (1) the
seriousness of the offense/public safety considerations; (2) the aggressiveness
or premeditation of the offense; (3) whether the offense was against persons
or property; (4) the merit of the case; (5) whether the child allegedly had adult
accomplices charged with the crime; (6) the maturity of the child; (7) the
child's previous history; and (8) public safety factors and the likelihood of
successful rehabilitation of the child. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
566-67 (1966).
80. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1996). Prosecutorial waiver is another
method which 13 states utilize. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 76, at 450. In
this method, the prosecutor alone chooses between juvenile court adjudication
and criminal court prosecution when both forums share concurrent
jurisdiction. Id. at 450 & n.4. Illinois abolished prosecutorial waiver in 1973
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gault. Wortman, supra note
77, at 2.

81. The Cannabis Control Act provides: "It is unlawful for any person
knowingly to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture, cannabis." 720 ILCS 550/5 (West 1996). Cannabis is the
scientific term for what is also known as marijuana.
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 206 (6th ed. 1990).
82. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1996). These criteria roughly correspond
with the criteria which the United States Supreme Court set forth for states
to follow in making transfer determinations. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67; People
v. Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill. 1987).
83. Clark, 518 N.E.2d at 143.
84. People v. Newell, 481 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
85. People v. Williamson, 475 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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2. Automatic Transfer
Automatic transfer is the statutorily imposed exclusion of
certain children from juvenile court jurisdiction." All cases arising
under these statutes must be filed in criminal court 7 Some states
have automatic transfer statutes that operate by lowering the age
at which a child charged with an offense can be excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction.88
Other states statutorily waive
jurisdiction for children who have a juvenile or criminal history of
prior felonies. 9
More states, however, statutorily waive
jurisdiction for minors who have committed violent offenses.9 °
These statutes complete the shifting of society's focus from the
child's need back to his or her deed: no matter the child's
circumstances or the situation involved, the decision to subject the
child to adult criminal prosecution is made solely on the nature of
the alleged offense.8 '
In Illinois, there are four categories of children who face
automatic transfer into criminal court.92 These include: (1) a child
fifteen years old or older 3 whom the state alleges committed "first
degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery
.. with a firearm, aggravated vehicular highjacking. . . with a
firearm," or certain weapons offenses while on school grounds;94 (2)
86. ILLINOIS JUD. CONF., supra note 77, at 96. Legislative waiver began
across the country in the 1970's. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 85.
As of 1995, half of all the states have enacted legislative waiver provisions.
Id. Illinois first adopted legislative waiver in 1982 in response to an increase
in juvenile crime in the latter part of the 1970's. Wortman, supra note 77, at
2. Some states have "reverse" transfer mechanisms: children who are subject
to criminal court prosecution due to legislative waiver provisions can be
transferred back to juvenile court jurisdiction. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra
note 5, at 85.
87. See, e.g., ILLINOIS JUD.CONF., supra note 77, at 96 (stating that under
Illinois law, all charges that fall under the ambit of automatic transfer
statutes must be filed in the criminal court).
88. Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal
Interventionon Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 336
n.30 (1997).
89. Id.
90. Id. Typically, these violent offenses include murder, rape, assault, and
robbery. Id.
91. See SIMONSEN, supra note 33, at 230 (using the phrase "child's need...
child's deed"); Feld, supra note 78, at 50.
92. ILLINOIS JUD. CONF., supra note 77, at 96-98.
93. The court determines the child's age for purposes of jurisdiction as his
or her age at the time of the alleged offense. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West
1996).
94. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996). This statute describes school
grounds as anywhere "in the building or on the grounds of any elementary or
secondary school, community college, college or university." Id. These school
grounds weapons offenses include: selling, manufacturing, buying, possessing,
or carrying any "bludgeon, black-jack, slung-shot [sic], sand-club, sand-bag,
metal knuckles, throwing star, or any ... switchblade knife ... or a ballistic
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a child fifteen years old or older whom the state alleges committed
certain drug-related offenses on or near school or public housing
agency property;95 (3) any child fifteen years old or older whom the
state alleges escaped from a penal institution or violated bail bond,
when the court had previously transferred that child to criminal
court due to discretionary transfer, voluntary transfer,96 or the two
above-mentioned automatic transfer provisions; 97 and (4) any child
thirteen years old or older whom the state alleges committed first
degree murder while committing criminal sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnapping.98
3. Hybrid Transfer Provisions

In addition to discretionary and automatic transfer, Illinois
has a hybrid transfer provision known as presumptive transfer. 99
The state's attorney may seek presumptive transfer of any child
fifteen years old or older whom the state alleges committed a Class
X felony (except armed violence), "aggravated discharge of a
firearm," and certain armed violence offenses.' 0 The juvenile court
then holds a hearing to determine if probable cause exists.0 ° A
finding of probable cause creates a rebuttable presumption that
the juvenile court should transfer jurisdiction of the child to the
criminal court.10 2 In deciding whether this presumption in favor of
transfer is rebutted, the juvenile court considers a set of factors
similar to the factors used in making discretionary transfer
decisions.0 3
knife.:' 720 ILCS 5/24-1(1) (West 1996). These offenses also include: carrying
a tear gas gun, bomb, or "any object containing noxious liquid gas or
substance."

720 ILCS 5/24-1(3) (West 1996). In addition, these offenses

include: carrying or possessing "any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other
firearm" in a vehicle or concealed on himself or herself. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(4)
(West 1996). Finally, these offenses also include: carrying or personally
possessing "any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm" on public

property. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(10) (West 1996).
95. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(7)(a) (West 1996). These drug offense include
knowingly manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with the intent to deliver
peyote, barbituric acid, amphetamine, methamphetamine, LSD, pentazocine,
morphine, cocaine, heroin, methaqualone, or PCP. 720 ILCS 570/401 (West
1996).

96. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(5) (West 1996). A minor aged 13 or older can move
for transfer to criminal court before juvenile court adjudicatory hearings have
begun. Id.
97. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(8)(a) (West 1996).

98. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(9)(a) (West 1996).
99. Wortman, supra note 77, at 2.
100. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.3)(a) (West 1996).

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at (b). These factors include: (1) the seriousness and circumstances
of the alleged offense; (2) the child's age; (3) the child's level of criminal

sophistication; (4) the chances rehabilitation in the juvenile system will be
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Concerns over gang activity motivated the Illinois General
Assembly to create another hybrid transfer provision, mandatory
transfer."' Mandatory transfer, which only operates on children
fifteen years old or older, is invoked when the state's attorney files
a motion alleging either: (1) the child committed a forcible felony
in promotion of an illegal gang-related activity and has a previous
felony delinquency adjudication; or (2) the child committed a
felony in promotion of an illegal gang-related activity and has a
previous forcible felony delinquency adjudication.'0 ' The juvenile
court then decides only if probable cause exists. 11 6 If the juvenile
court finds probable cause,
it must transfer jurisdiction of the child
07
to the criminal court.
As children have begun committing more and more acts of
violence,' °8 transfer of jurisdiction has become a favored method of
dealing with child offenders.'0 9 Indeed, transfer has proven to be
very popular with the public."' The slogan "If you're old enough to
do the crime, you're old enough to do the time," captures today's2
Politicians have not failed to take notice."1
sentiment."'
Presently, Congress is considering a bill to financially.coerce states
to prosecute more children as adults,"3 and Illinois has several

successful before the child leaves its jurisdiction; (5) the child's delinquency
record; (6) the presence of aggression or premeditation in the offense alleged;
and (7) whether the juvenile system has the resources necessary for
rehabilitating the child. Id.
104. Illinois v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700, 710 (Ill. 1991).
105. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.1), (3.2) (West 1996).
106. Id.
107. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.1), (3.2) (West 1996).
108. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 104. Between 1988 and 1991
the national arrest rate of children whom the state alleged committed violent
crimes (murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault)
increased 38%. Id. Between 1983 and 1992, the number of children arrested
for weapons violations increased 117%, the number of children arrested for
murder increased 128%, the number of children arrested for aggravated
assault increased 95%, and the number of children arrested for assault
increased 106%. Id. at 108.
109. Id. at 154. Discretionary transfer (judicial waiver) of jurisdiction alone
has increased 68% from 1988 (7000 cases) to 1992 (11,700 cases). Id.
110. Poll results from 1996 show that 75% of Americans are in favor of
prosecuting juveniles as adults. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 43-44. Even
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Ill.), a noted champion of liberal causes, has
registered her support for transferring certain juveniles into the criminal
court system. Id. at 44.
111. Lemov, supra note 74, at 27.
112. Id. Perhaps the old adage is true: "You don't need a weatherman to
know which way the wind blows." BOB DYLAN, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME
(Columbia, 1965).
113. See H.R. 3, 105th Cong. (1997) (limiting federal grants to states which
provide prosecutorial or legislative waiver applicable to children aged 15 or
older whom the state alleges committed violent crimes). The House of
Representatives passed this bill on May 8, 1997, and the bill is now pending in
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bills pending extending the reach of transfer provisions."' Yet,
even with the increased use of transfer provisions, juvenile crime
continues to pose major problems to society." 5
D. Extended JurisdictionJuvenile Prosecution:Blending Juvenile
Court Dispositions With CriminalCourt Sentences
Some states have responded to juvenile crime by
experimenting with innovative techniques for sentencing child
offenders." 6
One of these responses is a form of blended
sentencing known as extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution
(EJJP)."7 EJJP originated in Minnesota in the early 1990's."8 In
1992, Minnesota created a task force which developed a new
method for dealing with violent and chronic child offenders, one
which blended the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system
with the procedural rights and sentencing potential of the criminal
system." 9 In creating this new method, the task force was fueled
the Senate. Id.
114. See H.R. 182, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (extending
automatic transfer for weapons offenses on school grounds to include weapons
offenses within 1000 feet of schools); see also H.R. 1358, 90th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (extending presumptive transfer to include unlawful use
of weapons and violations of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act); H.R.
1361, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (extending automatic transfer
to include children 13 years or older whom the state alleges committed home
invasion); H.R. 1362, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (extending
mandatory transfer to include children 13 years or older whom the state
alleges committed a felony when that child has two previous felony
delinquency adjudications).
115. Lacayo, supra note 7, at 26. By 1995, the arrest rate for children whom
the state alleges committed violent crimes increased 67% from its 1985 rate.
Id. If the increasing trend in the crime rate continues, the number of children
whom the state alleges committed a violent crime will increase about 100%
from 1992 levels by the year 2010, while the number of children whom the
state alleges committed murder will increase 145% from 1992 levels by that
date. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 111; Stephen Goode, Juvenile
Crime Comes of Age, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 10. While popular support
for transfer is the public's response to juvenile violence, only 34% of all cases
nationwide which the juvenile court transferred by discretionary transfer
(judicial waiver) in 1992 were for violent crimes against people. SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 154. The remaining 66% of these cases were for
property offenses, public order offenses, and drug offenses. Id.
116. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
CRIME 11 (1996).

117. Id. at 12. Blended sentencing involves the blending of juvenile
dispositions and criminal sentences in such a manner that a child offender is
sentenced as a juvenile, as an adult, or as both. Id. at 11.
118. See generally Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case
Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1038-51 (1995)
[hereinafter Case Study] (discussing the circumstances surrounding the
development and adoption of EJJP in Minnesota in detail).
119. Id. at 986. The new system enables the juvenile court to operate much
like the criminal court while still offering access to rehabilitative services. Id.
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with a determination to strengthen the rehabilitative power of the
juvenile system and keep as many children as could be saved out
of adult prison. 120 In 1994, Minnesota adopted the new method
proposed by the task force. 2 ' Several other states have since
adopted EJJP in their efforts to alleviate the problem of juvenile
crime. 122
EJJP eligibility varies by jurisdiction but generally extends to
children between ages fourteen and seventeen whom the state
alleges committed serious offenses. 21 Depending on the alleged
offense and the age of the child, either the prosecutor or the
juvenile court designates EJJP of a child offender.' 2' An EJJPdesignated child stands trial in the juvenile court. 125 Unlike
children facing traditional juvenile court adjudication, an EJJPdesignated child receives the full panoply of procedural rights,
including trial
by jury, that defendants receive in criminal court
126
prosecutions.
If the child is convicted or pleads guilty, then the juvenile
court imposes two sentences on the child: a traditional juvenile

The task force developed this "new transitional component between the
juvenile and the adult systems" while trying "[t]o avoid re-creating a false
dichotomy." Id. at 1038.
120. Regina Akers, Kansas Considers Tougher Sentences for Young Inmates;
If Passed, New Rules Could Give Some Youths Two-Part Sentences, KAN. CITY
STAR, Jan. 25, 1996, at C2. Both state legislators and judges from Minnesota
consider EJJP to be a conservative measure because of its focus on
rehabilitation. Id. The task force was dissatisfied with the limited options
available for dealing with young offenders, especially the artificial constraints
inherent in exclusive prosecution under either the criminal or the juvenile
justice system. Case Study, supra note 118, at 1038. This dissatisfaction
resulted, in part, from a recognition that teenagers possess a wide range of
maturity levels which necessitates a similarly wide range of available
responses to teenage crime. Id.
121. Case Study, supra note 118, at 987. The bill encompassing the task
force's recommendations won unanimous approval from both houses of
Minnesota's legislature on April 29, 1994. Id. On May 5, 1994, Minnesota's
governor, Arne Carlson, signed the bill into law. Id.
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-16,126
(1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1997).
123. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c(a) (1997) (allowing EJJP of
serious repeat child offenders aged 14 and older who face felony charges);
MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997) (allowing EJJP of children between ages 14 and
17 who face felony charges). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1997)
(allowing EJJP of children aged 12 and older who face charges of committing a
felony with a firearm).
124. MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1997).
But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c (1997) (allowing only the juvenile court
to designate EJJP).
125. MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997).
126. Id. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c(f) (1997) (mandating criminal
court prosecution of EJJP-designated children who refuse to waive their right
to a jury trial).
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court disposition and an adult criminal sentence." ' The court
stays the adult criminal sentence as long as the child successfully
21 8
completes the juvenile disposition in the juvenile system.
However, if the child commits a new offense before completing the
juvenile disposition or breaks a term of the disposition, then the
juvenile court has authority to revoke the stay and order the
implementation of the adult sentence.'29 Before such revocation
may occur, the court must inform the child of the reasons for
revoking the stay and must afford the child an opportunity to
contest the revocation in a hearing in which the child is entitled to
legal representation.' 0 If the court finds that the child in fact reoffended or broke a term of the juvenile disposition, one form of
EJJP requires the court to revoke the stay and order
implementation of the adult sentence,"' while another form of
EJJP grants the court discretion to maintain the stay and allow
EJJP status to continue
if warranted by mitigating

circumstances.

132

While EJJP is still relatively new, this form of blended
sentencing is already promising to reduce recidivism among child
offenders." 3 The overwhelming majority of children prosecuted
under EJJP are successfully completing their juvenile
dispositions."3 Some of these children credit EJJP with deterring
them from negative behavior and even with turning their lives
around. 13' EJJP is emerging an as effective weapon in the arsenal

127. MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-16,126 (1997).
132. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c (1997); MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1997).
133. See 'Blended Sentences' for Youths, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at B4
[hereinafter Blended Sentences] (reporting a lower recidivism rate for EJJP

youth than for transferred youth in Minnesota).
134. Pam Belluck, Fighting Youth Crime, Some States Blend Adult and
Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al. During the first year and a
half of EJJP implementation in Minnesota, out of a total of 339 EJJPdesignated children 297 children have refrained from re-offending or breaking
a dispositional term. Id. Although 42 children have failed under EJJP, their
failure was often due to such minor probation infractions such as marijuana
use, quitting employment, and missing appointments. Id. Perhaps many of
these children might have succeeded under EJJP if the juvenile court had
exercised its discretion to allow their EJJP status to continue.
135. See, e.g., id. (discussing the experiences of some EJJP youth in
Minnesota). One child had a history of auto theft and drug dealing when he
was sentenced under EJJP for threatening a person with a gun. Id. After
successfully completing the first year and a half of his juvenile disposition, the
high school senior explained, "There are times when I think that I just want
to have a joint, have a drink, make some money somehow, but I just think, it'll
pass." Belluck, supra note 134, at A24. Another child who was sentenced
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in the war against youth crime.
II.

EXCLUSIVE UTILIZATION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CANNOT EFFECTIVELY SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

For one hundred years, Illinois has depended on the juvenile
justice system to rehabilitate young offenders.'8 In recent years,
however, Illinois has responded to a surge in youth violence by
transferring an increasing number of children into the criminal
court system.
Unfortunately, neither the juvenile justice system
nor the criminal justice system acting alone have been successful
in combatting the problem of juvenile crime.
This Part analyzes the ineffectiveness of exclusively utilizing
the juvenile justice system or the adult criminal justice system in
response to the problem of juvenile crime. Section A examines the
lack of accountability in the juvenile justice system. Section B
addresses the deficiencies inherent in the transfer of children into
the adult criminal court, focusing on the failure of the criminal
justice system to rehabilitate children whom the system could
otherwise save. Section C discusses how EJJP will effectively
address the problem of juvenile violence by rendering young
offenders accountable for their conduct and by giving older, but
still malleable, children "one last chance" at rehabilitation.
A. The Juvenile Justice System CannotAlone Stem the Tide of
Juvenile Crime
The hypothetical character Frank portrayed in the
Introduction of this Comment exemplifies one of the juvenile
justice system's greatest challenges. While the system aims to
rehabilitate delinquent children, it often fails to attain that goal
with its toughest "clientele": the chronic and the potentially violent
juvenile offender. 1 9 Chronic offenders face repeated adjudication
in the system, yet they continue committing even more delinquent
acts. 4' These children have little incentive to reform.' They are
under EJJP for assaulting other teenagers learned self-control while serving
out his juvenile disposition. Id. In discussing his experience he stated, "I got
a nice job. I'm in college. I got people depending on me and I don't want to let
them down." Id.
136. Riggs, supra note 51, at 1.

137. Wortman, supra note 77, at 3.
138. Yeckel, supra note 88, at 355-56.
139. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 214 (criticizing the juvenile court system
for failing to effectively deal with young violent offenders).
140. See Mary Wisniewski Holden, State's Prosecutors Eyeing Bill For
Juvenile Justice Reforms, CHI. LAW., Feb. 1997, at 8 (discussing recidivism
among juvenile offenders in Illinois); Cf. Kramer, supra note 12, at 215
(stating that police were arresting delinquent boys for committing violent
crime while on parole); Paul J. McNulty, Natural Born Killers, POL'Y REV.,
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savvy to the fact that in the juvenile
justice system child offenders
1 42
are not accountable for their acts.
The lack of accountability of juvenile offenders in the juvenile
justice system is a result of the defining attribute of the system
itself. 14' The system is a "juvenile" system; thus, by definition, it
can only maintain wardship'" over children it1'5 has adjudicated
146
delinquent until they reach the age of nineteen or twenty-one.
Winter 1995, at 84, 87 (discussing news reports about teenagers with long
arrest records committing more violence).
141. Cf. Kramer, supra note 12, at 215 (arguing that the juvenile court
system promotes recidivism by demonstrating to delinquents "that they can
get away" with criminal activity).
142. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 44 (citing Senator Carol MoseleyBraun's observation that the present juvenile court system does not deter
violent youths); see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 215 (discussing the
attitudes of child offenders toward the juvenile justice system); cf Holden,
supra note 140, at 8 (identifying a concern of Illinois legislators that the
juvenile system needs to hold child offenders accountable for their conduct).
143. Cf Stephen Wizner, Struggling For A Future: Juvenile Violence,
Juvenile Justice: On Youth Crime And The Juvenile Court, 36 B.C. L. REV.
1025, 1026 (1995) (discussing the inability of the juvenile court to rehabilitate
child offenders or protect society due to its lack of authority to provide
services or commitment for a long enough period of time); McNulty, supra
note 140, at 86 (berating the lack of accountability in the juvenile system due
to the absence of meaningful consequences for criminal actions).
144. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(16) (West 1996) (defining a ward of the court as a
minor "subject to the dispositional powers of the court under this Act" after a
court determination that such status is in the best interests of the child and
the public).
145. 705 ILCS 405/5-34(1) (West 1996). This includes most juveniles. Id.
146. 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996) (setting age 21 for children at least
13 years old whom the court has adjudicated delinquent of first degree
murder); 705 ILCS 405/5-35(f) (setting age 21 for habitual juvenile offenders);
705 ILCS 405/5-36(f) (setting age 21 for violent juvenile offenders); 705 ILCS
405/5-34(1)(a) (setting age 21 for juveniles over which a court has found good
cause to extend wardship). Illinois defines a "habitual juvenile offender" as a
minor whom the juvenile court has adjudicated delinquent twice for felonies
before adjudicating delinquent a third time for committing or attempting to
commit "first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary
manslaughter; criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault;
aggravated or heinous battery involving permanent disability or
disfigurement or great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a home or other
residence... ; robbery or armed robbery; or aggravated arson." 705 ILCS
405/5-35(f)(a). This definition applies only to children whose third offense
occurred after January 1, 1980. Id. at 35(a). Additionally, this definition only
applies when the third offense occurred subsequent to the second
adjudication, and the second offense occurred subsequent to the first
adjudication. Id. Illinois defines a "violent juvenile offender" as a minor
whom the juvenile court has: (1) adjudicated delinquent of a felony Class 2 or
greater which involves using or threatening "physical force or violence
against" another person; or (2) adjudicated delinquent twice for a felony Class
2 or greater (the second offense occurring subsequent to the first adjudication,
and the second offense occurring "on or after January 1, 1995") when the use
or the possession of a firearm is an element of the offense. 705 ILCS 405/5-
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Once a delinquent child reaches this maximum age, the Illinois
juvenile justice system loses control over that individual, and that
individual loses access to rehabilitative services.' 7
Children,
especially younger children who are less likely to face transfer,
know that they can continue to commit delinquent acts and have
148
all responsibility for such acts vanish at age twenty-one.
Likewise, no matter how promising a treatment may be and how
desperately a certain child may need this treatment in order to
turn that child's life around, the juvenile justice system has only a
very limited time in which to effectuate the child's rehabilitation 9
Many times this short period is not enough.5 ° The unfortunate
result is that young offenders leave the system before achieving
rehabilitation. 5 '
Adding to this lack of accountability is the premature release
of delinquent children from their dispositional placements.1 2 In
Illinois, the average child committed to the Department of
Corrections spent only 308 days in custody."53 National data,
which incorporate Illinois statistics, demonstrate that most
children committed to a correctional facility in the juvenile system

36(e). Under 705 ILCS 405/5-34(1), a court can extend wardship over a child
adjudicated delinquent until age 21 when the court finds that this extension is
necessary to serve the best interests of both the child and the public. 705
ILCS 405/5-34(1). This finding must be based on evidence as opposed to the
independent judgment of the judge. Id.
147. 705 ILCS 405/5-34(1) (West 1996).
148. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 44 (clarifying Senator Carol MoseleyBraun's statement that under the present system children "can shoot someone
with impunity at 14 years of age" as meaning that child predators are not
deterred from murdering others since they know they will escape adult
punishment); see also Curriden, supra note 73, at 66 (quoting juvenile court
prosecutor William McGee as stating, "These kids think [the system is] a joke.
They have no respect for the system.").
149. See 705 ILCS 405/5-34(1) (West 1996) (allowing juvenile court officials
only a time period as long as the difference between the child's age and 21 to
effect rehabilitation).
150. See COORDINATING COUNCIL ON JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
COMBATING VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY: THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE
ACTION PLAN SUMMARY 5 (1996) [hereinafter COORDINATING COUNCIL]
(suggesting extending wardship past age 21 for children who need more
access to rehabilitative services); see also TORBET ET AL., supra note 116, at 15
(presenting the argument that the time allowed in the juvenile system to
rehabilitate child offenders is insufficient).
151. See Holden, supra note 140, at 8 (stating that 10.6% of individuals
released from the Illinois Department of Corrections Juvenile Division in 1992
entered the Illinois Department of Corrections Adult Division within three
years).
152. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 214 (alleging that violent child offenders
perceive no consequences to their actions because rehabilitative efforts by the
juvenile court system are "ineffective" and "short in duration").
153. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 177. This data refers to children
released from custody in 1992. Id.
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gain early release through parole; only two percent of released
delinquents leave correctional facilities because they have reached
the age at which wardship legally must terminate. 4 Even repeat
offenders and violent youths can leave Illinois correctional
facilities early. 5 5 Children who have committed first degree
murder are eligible for parole after only five years commitment to
the Department of Corrections. 56 Habitual juvenile offenders and
violent juvenile offenders can serve substantially less time than
commitment until age twenty-one. 57 Thus, the critical time in
which the juvenile system has to rehabilitate these children is
often much shorter than would appear from the original
dispositional orders."
These policies of terminating wardship at age twenty-one and
releasing violent children early have a profound impact on the
children involved and on society. The system arrests youth,
adjudicates them delinquent, and releases them early, even if they
have committed violent offenses." 9 These children have not had
long enough access to treatment to become rehabilitated. °
Instead, they discover there is nothing the juvenile system can do
to them that will have long-lasting consequences on their lives.''
154. Id. Researchers collected this data from 29 states, including Illinois,
and the data refers to children released from custody in 1992.
Id.
Interestingly, more children left state juvenile correctional systems through
escape, death, or transfer to another non-criminal jurisdiction than through
"aging out;" i.e., becoming an adult. Id.
155. See 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996) (prescribing commitment of
murderous children to the Department of Corrections with a parole option
after the specified period); see also 705 ILCS 405/5-35(f) (West 1996)
(permitting "good conduct credit" for habitual juvenile offenders); 705 ILCS
405/5-36(f) (West 1996) (permitting "good conduct credit" for violent juvenile
offenders).
156. 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996). This provision only applies to
children aged 13 and older. Id.
157. 706 ILCS 405/5-35(f), 36(f) (West 1996). These provisions purport to
require commitment to the Department of Corrections of habitual juvenile
offenders and violent juvenile offenders until age 21 with no possibility of
parole. Id. However, these children are allowed to accrue one day of "good
conduct credit" for each day the child served which the system applies as a
reduction in their terms of commitment. Id. Conceivably, a child offender in
one of these two categories could spend only half the "required" time in
custody. See id. (explaining "good conduct credit" reductions in Department of
Corrections commitments).
158. See id. (allowing a built-in early release mechanism).
159. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 44 (discussing the results of a study
which found that the juvenile justice system is failing to impose commitments
of sufficient duration on violent child offenders).
160. See id. (discussing the disturbing number of boys arrested for
committing violent acts while on parole); see also Holden, supra note 140, at 8
(stating that the recidivism rate for juveniles leaving the Illinois Department
of Corrections in 1992 was 35% over a three year period).
161. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 215.
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Armed with the knowledge that they are not accountable for their
actions, these children go back on the streets and commit more
crimes. 6 Tragically, these new offenses are often more violent
than earlier transgressions.6 6 Then the cycle continues: arrest,
adjudication, disposition, release, crime.
The current system not only fosters recidivism among
delinquent children, but it also encourages other youths to engage
in illegal acts."6 Children who witness their peers commit an
assortment of crimes only to return to the streets learn that there
are no personal consequences to violence, at least none to be feared
from the state.165 Thus, an effective implement of crime prevention
is effectively emasculated.
Many children
For many children the system works.' 6'
released from the custody of the juvenile system never return.' 67
While these success stories are undeniably true, it is also true that
These are the children
some children fall through the cracks.'
the state must reach to solve the problem of juvenile delinquency.
The juvenile justice system cannot solve the problem on its own.
B. The CriminalCourt Is Not A Panacea
The surge in violent youth crime has led Illinois to
increasingly transfer children into criminal court.1 69 Some of these
children are already so hardened that there is little the juvenile

162. See supra note 160 (discussing the high recidivism rate for child
offenders in Illinois).

163. McNulty, supra note 140, at 86.
164. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 213 (implying that children learn
about the ineffectiveness of the juvenile system by observing the lenient way
it treats delinquent minors).

165. Id.
166. See James R. Covington III, Legislative Activity In Juvenile Justice,
JUv. JUST. COMM. NEWSL., Oct. 1996, at 1, 6 (discussing study results finding
that children whom the state adjudicates in the juvenile court system have a

lower recidivism rate than children whom the state prosecutes in the criminal
court); see also Juvenile Act Amendments "Discouraging",JUV. JUST. COMM.
NEWSL., Sept. 1996, at 9 (stating that legislators seeking to reform the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act are not looking at the aspects of the juvenile system that
work); cf Riggs, supra note 51, at 3 (commenting that the recent "get tough"

attitude in Illinois politics is contrary to the welfare of the child offender and
the community).
167. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 158 (stating that most
children adjudicated delinquent are never adjudicated again in the system);
see also Holden, supra note 140, at 8 (discussing statistics that show that 65%
of Illinois youths released from the Department of Corrections do not return
to either the juvenile system or the criminal system within three years).
168. See Curriden, supra note 73, at 67 (citing juvenile court judge Bertrand
Poritsky's observation that the juvenile system is allowing delinquent, yet

"impressionable," children to slip away).
169. Wortman, supra note 77, at 1-3.
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system can do for them." ° For these children, transfer is the last
7
best solution.'1
Many, however, like the hypothetical character
Laura from the Introduction of this Comment, are still amenable
to treatment if only they had the opportunity for long-term access
to it. 17' Unfortunately, they will not receive this treatment in the
criminal system.'73
Society, through transfer, has effectively
'written off' these children. 7 This sacrifice, however, has failed
to
alleviate the problem of youth violence.' 7'
Rehabilitation is not a major emphasis of the criminal justice
system. 176 With its focus on punishment, this system is
unconcerned with the needs of children whom the juvenile system
has abandoned.' 77 These children will enter penal facilities 7 ' that
are unable and unwilling to treat them.1 7'9 While juvenile facilities
have programs which foster personal growth and positive

170. Cf.ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 45 (noting the argument that some
youth offenders deserve transfer to the adult criminal system).
171. See Curriden, supra note 73, at 66 (quoting a juvenile court judge as
stating that some children will grow into violent adult criminals no matter
what services the juvenile system provides them); cf Victor L. Streib, The
Death Penalty Should Not Be Imposed On Violent Youths, in YOUTH VIOLENCE
243, 247 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1992) (describing the "defiant, swaggering
attitudes" of some child offenders as foreshadowing violent behavior on their
parts for the rest of their lives).
172. See Juvenile Injustice. Trying Juveniles As Adults, AMERICA, Sept. 28,
1996, at 3 [hereinafter Juvenile Injustice] (claiming that transfer use often
encompasses children who are highly amenable to treatment in the juvenile
system); see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text discussing Laura's
dilemma.
173. See JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 388 (stating that the
adult justice system offers its charges significantly less rehabilitative services
than the juvenile justice system offers its charges).
174. See Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent And The Juvenile
Court: Is There Still A Place For Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 58
(1992) (using the term "write these children off').
175. Wortman, supra note 77, at 3. Although Illinois has been resorting to
transfer increasingly since 1982, juvenile arrests for violent crimes in Illinois
rose from 8.9% in 1988 to 12.8% in 1992. Id.
176. JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 388; Martin, supra note
174, at 58.
177. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 47 (discussing the lack of services for
children within the prison system).
178. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 178 (reporting that 16 is the
minimum age in Illinois for imprisonment in the Department of Corrections
Adult Division); see also Lisa Stansky, Age Of Innocence: More And More
States Are Telling Teens: If You Do An Adult Crime, You'll Serve Adult Time,
82 ABA J. 60, 61-62 (Nov. 1996) (stating that federal law proscribing the
imprisonment of children with adults is not applicable to children convicted in
criminal court). In 1990, Illinois incarcerated 251 children under 18 in adult
prison. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 178.
179. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 47 (commenting on the inability of the
criminal system to treat child offenders); see also Wortman, supra note 77, at
3 (commenting on the inability of the criminal system to treat child offenders).
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socialization, prisons are characterized by their dearth of
counseling opportunities, medical treatment, and programs which
address dysfunctional family relationships. 8 ' Furthermore, the
adult criminal justice system sorely lacks the opportunities for
vocational training and educational advancement that are
available in the juvenile justice system.18 ' The criminal justice
system also fails to provide the intense follow-up services and
parole supervision that are necessary elements of the juvenile
justice system.'' The children who are imprisoned in the adult
system will eventually re-enter society, but they will lack the
rehabilitation and the education they will need to succeed. 8 '
This is not to say, however, that these children will not
receive an education. The prisons will provide them an excellent
education on becoming hardened criminals.'4 Children in prison
face a risk of suffering sexual assault five times as great as the
risk faced by children in the juvenile justice system. 8' Similarly,
they face a risk two times that of youths in the juvenile justice
system of being beaten by staff. 8 ' They also have a fifty percent
greater risk of being assaulted with a weapon."" Besides becoming
fodder for adult sexual predators," these children are
internalizing the criminal identity with which they are labeled. 8 9
These children now have reputations they must live up to and
expectations placed upon them which they must fulfill.' 90 By the
time these children "graduate" from this "school,"'' 91 they will have

180. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 47; see also Stansky, supra note 178, at 62
(quoting Jeffery Fagan, the director of the Center for Violence Research and
Prevention at Columbia University, as stating that an imprisoned child does
not learn the skills necessary "to become a family member, husband, neighbor,
or worker").
181. Compare JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 27, at 508 (discussing
the expansive educational programs available in juvenile training schools),
with Sander N. Rothchild, Note & Comment, Beyond Incarceration:Juvenile
Sex Offender Treatment Programs Offer Youth A Second Chance, 4 J.L. &
POL'Y 718, 742 n.97 (1996) (explaining that prisons generally do not offer
educational programs geared for children).
182. Wortman, supra note 77, at 3.
183. See Martin, supra note 174, at 91 (warning that society will one day
have to deal with the children it has "written off'); see also Lemov, supra note
74, at 29 (describing the predicament of children released from adult prison
who lack education and job skills).
184. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 47; Stansky, supra note 178, at 62.
185. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 47.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. (describing adult sentencing of children as having "the
unfortunate side effect of. .. 'handing them over to adult sexual predators"').
189. Stansky, supra note 178, at 62.
190. See id. (referring to the process as being "prisonized").
191. See id. at 61-62 (characterizing the criminal justice system as "schools
for crimes").
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learned what it takes to be a hard-core criminal. 9 '
Imprisoning children still amenable to treatment exacts a
great toll on society. Society will face losing potentially productive
members. Children removed from society for a long period of time
will be unable to fulfill their human potential or make any positive
contribution to the community."' When they eventually re-enter
society, these children will lack the education, skills, and
motivation necessary to find a job, make a living, and assimilate
smoothly into their communities.
Even those released after
relatively short terms of confinement will find themselves socially
and educationally disadvantaged with dim job prospects. 195 Many
of them, if given the rehabilitative and educational programs of
the juvenile justice system, could benefit society. Instead, many
will become a burden. Society must ask itself if it is willing to pay
this price.
Society might decide it is willing to pay this awful price as a
necessary sacrifice in its war against violence."6 However, upon
making this sacrifice, society will discover that its sanctions have
served to increase violent crime instead of alleviating it. 197 When
these individuals, whom the state could have rehabilitated but did
not, are released without the skills necessary to assimilate, many
will rely on the skills they think they need to survive: they will fall
back on their education as criminals.9 Studies demonstrate that
children sentenced as adults have a higher incidence of recidivism
than similar children adjudicated for the same crime in the
juvenile system.'"
192. See id. at 61 (stating that children released from prison have learned
"the ropes" from hardened adult inmates).
193. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 116, at 7 (discussing research that
indicates that violent child offenders who face prosecution in the adult
criminal court receive "substantially longer" terms of commitment than those
who face adjudication in the juvenile system).
194. See Stansky, supra note 178, at 62 (discussing how incarcerated

children do not learn the life skills necessary to assimilate into society).
195. Id.; see also Rothchild, supra note 181, at 742 (stating that short prison

stays greatly harm children).
196. See Feld, supra note 78, at 69 (characterizing transferred children as
"symbolic scapegoats").
197. See Wortman, supra note 77, at 3 (discussing recidivism rates that

show that child offenders are more likely to commit further crime if the state
prosecutes them in the criminal court rather than adjudicating them in the
juvenile system; presenting statistics that show juvenile crime rates in Illinois
increased after reliance on transfer).
198. Cf Stansky, supra note 178, at 61 (expressing concern that children
released from prison will be "a greater menace to society" due to their training

from adult criminals).
199. ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 46; see also Wortman, supra note 77, at 3

(noting that the rate of recidivism for children whom the state prosecutes as
adults is substantially greater than rates for those whom the state adjudicates
in the juvenile system); Lemov, supra note 74, at 29 (discussing similar
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Besides failing to prevent these individuals from committing
more crimes, surrendering these children to the criminal justice
system fails to deter other youths from engaging in violent acts. °°
In some ways, increased use of transfer might actually result in
even younger children committing crime. As older youths in a
gang setting are confronted with the prospect of transfer, they
might engage younger, transfer-proof children to carry out their
orders. As society is losing its youth, the problem of juvenile crime
continues.20 ' The adult criminal justice system is not a panacea.0 2
C. EJJPProvidesAccountability And Rehabilitation
The inherent weaknesses of both the juvenile justice system
and the criminal justice system preclude the successful resolution
of the problem of juvenile crime by either system alone.02
However, overlapping the jurisdictions of the juvenile justice
system and the criminal justice system provides an effective and
flexible method for dealing with these child offenders who, because
of their age or amenability to treatment, should not face outright
transfer to the criminal system.0 4
EJJP provides a strong dose of accountability that traditional
juvenile court adjudication lacks.00 Since EJJP provides for the
imposition of the stayed adult sentence upon a finding that the
child offender has broken the terms of the juvenile disposition or
has committed a new offense before termination of the juvenile

results from a study in New York and New Jersey); Stansky, supra note 178,
at 62 (describing similar results from a study in Florida).
200. See ROWLAND, supra note 17, at 46 (arguing that deterrence is not an
effective force on children); see also Juvenile Injustice, supra note 172, at 3

(noting that peer pressure often overwhelms children).
201. See Wortman, supra note 77, at 3 (describing the increase in youth
violence even as Illinois has taken a tougher approach towards child
offenders).
202. See COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 150, at 4 (recommending that
transfer occur only when the child's behavior indicates the necessity of
criminal punishment as determined by the child's background of criminal

conduct, the ineffectiveness of past rehabilitative efforts, and the violence of
the child's act); see also JAMES 0. FINKENAUER, SCARED STRAIGHT AND THE
PANACEA PHENOMENON 4 (1982) (using the term "panacea" in reference to

attempts to solve the problem of juvenile crime).

203. See Yeckel, supra note 88, at 352 (noting that neither the juvenile court
system nor the adult criminal court system have been able to solve the
problem of juvenile violence).
204. See Stansky, supra note 178, at 64 (quoting a North Carolina

prosecutor as stating that not all child offenders should be "tossed in [adult]
jail").
205. See Case Study, supra note 118, at 1041 (agreeing with a task force of
Minnesota judges and legislators who referred to EJJP with its increased

power as "a juvenile court 'on steroids' or one with 'a long handle and a
stronger leash').
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disposition, child offenders gain responsibility for their conduct."'
They are well aware their rejection of rehabilitative efforts carries
a steep price.0 7 The firm imposition of meaningful consequences
(i.e., the activation of the criminal sentence) will motivate these
children to take an active role in their own rehabilitation.2 8 They
will be less likely to engage in further delinquent activity knowing
that doing so will have a drastic, immediate effect upon them.00
Accordingly, they will be more likely to conform to the strictures of
21 °
their treatment programs since they know that they must.

Furthermore, this treatment will be more effective by extending
the time in which these EJJP children are subject to juvenile
system wardship. 11 Chronic and violent juvenile offenders will no
longer be able to scoff at the system.02 The result will be a
decrease in recidivism among those children who can achieve
rehabilitation and incarceration for the few who cannot.0 3
In addition to imposing accountability on young violent
offenders, EJJP offers older, yet impressionable, child offenders
one last chance at rehabilitation.214 Under current Illinois law,
many of these children face automatic or mandatory transfer to
the adult criminal court regardless of their individual
circumstances or their potential for rehabilitation. 5 With EJJP
206. See COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 150, at 5 (describing the
accountability under EJJP of child offenders who face an adult sentence if
they break the program's requirements); see also Case Study, supra note 118,
at 1041 (describing the consequences of violating a juvenile dispositional
condition under EJJP).
207. See Belluck, supra note 134, at A24 (quoting a Minnesota youth who
was sentenced under EJJP as stating that he has resisted the temptation to
take drugs).
208. TORBETETAL., supra note 116, at 16.
209. See Blended Sentences, supra note 133, at B4 (reporting the apparent

success of EJJP in lowering recidivism among child offenders).
210. See Cameron McWhirter & Mark Braykovich, Solutions: Other States'
Laws Having Some Success, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 22, 1996, at Al
(reporting that out of 112 Minnesota EJJP offenders, only 11 broke the terms
of their juvenile dispositions or committed new crimes before their
dispositions terminated).
211. See COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 150, at 5 (discussing extending
wardship past age 21 for treatment purposes).
212. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 215 (presenting the prevalent attitude
among child offenders towards the present juvenile justice system as "They
can't do nothing to me, I ain't 16 yet").
213. See Blended Sentences, supra note 133, at B4 (citing the apparent lower
rate of recidivism among EJJP youth).
214. COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 150, at 5.

215. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.1) (West 1996) (prescribing mandatory transfer
for children aged 15 or older who have a prior felony delinquency adjudication
and now face allegations of committing a forcible felony in the promotion of
illegal gang activity); see also 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.2) (West 1996) (prescribing
mandatory transfer for children aged 15 or older who have a prior forcible
felony adjudication and now face allegations of committing a felony in the
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available, the juvenile court can take these factors into
consideration216 and offer those children who might yet benefit
from the juvenile justice system one final chance at receiving
rehabilitative services. 17
Society would benefit from the implementation of EJJP of
older children. First, children who would otherwise be lost will 2be18
able to become productive, contributing members of society.
Second, society will suffer less crime since those children who
successfully complete their juvenile dispositions under EJJP so far
have proven less likely to commit additional crimes than those
children who have completed sentences in the criminal justice
system.219 Thus, EJJP can effectively address the problem of youth

violence by combining the accountability of the criminal justice
system with the rehabilitation of the juvenile justice system. °
EJJP
Recognizing that the problem of juvenile delinquency
continues to exact a heavy toll despite the resources and dedicated
staff in the juvenile justice system and despite increased reliance
on transfer to the adult criminal court, the Illinois General
Assembly passed its own version of EJJP.2
This version
III. ILLINOIS SHOULD UTILIZE A POWERFUL VERSION OF

promotion of illegal gang activity); 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996)
(applying automatic transfer to children aged 15 or older whom the state
alleges committed "first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
armed robbery... with a firearm, aggravated vehicular highjacking ... with
a firearm," or weapons offenses on school grounds); 705 ILCS 405/5-4(7)(a)
(West 1996) (applying automatic transfer to children aged 15 or older whom
the state alleges dealt drugs on or near school grounds or public housing
property); 705 ILCS 405/5-8(a) (West 1996) (applying automatic transfer to
children whom the state alleges escaped from a penal institution or violated
ball bond after the state had already transferred them under various
statutory provisions to the criminal court for other offenses); 705 ILCS 405/54(9)(a) (West 1996) (applying automatic transfer to children age 13 or older
"charged with first degree murder committed during the course of either
aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated
kidnaping [sic]").
216. See Akers, supra note 120, at C2 (describing how EJJP in Minnesota is
utilized on a "case-by-case basis," considering factors such as the child's age
and criminal background).
217. See Case Study, supra note 118, at 1041 (agreeing with Minnesota
judges and legislators that EJJP gives some youths "one last chance" at
rehabilitation).
218. See Martin, supra note 174, at 58 (stating that "society deserves the
chance to gain the non-violent citizen" who is capable of being rehabilitated).
219. See Blended Sentences, supra note 133, at B4 (reporting the apparent
success of EJJP in lowering recidivism among child offenders).
220. See COORDINATING COUNCIL, supra note 150, at 5 (discussing the
ability of EJJP to provide both accountability and rehabilitation).
221. Long & Cetera, supra note 19, at B8. After its initial passage,
Governor James Edgar sent the bill back to the Illinois General Assembly
with an amendatory veto that suggested adding some flexibility to the
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represents an excellent first step in implementing EJJP in Illinois.
However, this version could be strengthened by allowing more
flexibility in the utilization and implementation of EJJP. This
Section proposes a model statute instituting a strong form of EJJP
in Illinois.
Section A sets forth statutory language and
explanatory comments extending the option of EJJP designation to
a wide range of child offenders, including older children who
demonstrate an amenability to treatment but are eligible for
automatic transfer. Section B sets forth statutory language and
explanatory comments detailing EJJP trial and sentencing
guidelines which provide the juvenile court discretion in dealing
with re-offending and term-breaking youth while extending
wardship over EJJP youth from age twenty-one to age twentyfour.
A. Proposed 705 ILCS 405/5-4.5(1) EJJPDesignation
(A) (1)THE STATE'S ATTORNEY MAY FILE A MOTION REQUESTING
EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTION OF:
(i) ANY MINOR AGAINST WHOM THE STATE COULD SEEK
DISCRETIONARY, PRESUMPTIVE, OR MANDATORY TRANSFER TO
THE CRIMINAL COURT; 223 OR
(ii) ANY MINOR WHO WOULD OTHERWISE FACE AUTOMATIC
TRANSFER UNDER ILCS 405/5-4. 524
(2) UPON SUCH MOTION BY THE STATE'S ATTORNEY, THE COURT:
(i) SHALL DESIGNATE EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE
PROSECUTION FOR THOSE MINORS AGAINST WHOM THE STATE
COULD SEEK PRESUMPTIVE OR MANDATORY TRANSFER TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT AND THOSE MINORS WHO WOULD OTHERWISE
FACE MANDATORY TRANSFER UNDER 705 ILCS 405/5-4;225

(ii) MAY DESIGNATE EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE
PROSECUTION FOR THOSE MINORS AGAINST WHOM THE STATE
COULD SEEK DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
IF THE COURT, AFTER A HEARING, DETERMINES THAT THE
measure. Christi Parsons, Juvenile Reform Act Gets Edgar Backing, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 25, 1998, at 5; Telephone Interview with Randall Roberts,
Supervisor of the Delinquency Division, Office of the State's Attorney,
Juvenile Justice Bureau (Apr. 27, 1998). The General Assembly approved the
changes offered by Governor Edgar, and the law will go into effect on January
1, 1999. Long & Cetera, supra note 19, at B8.
222. S. 363, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997-98). This bill is known
as the Juvenile Justice Reform Act. Id.
223. See ILL. S. 363 (providing for EJJP designation of certain offenses
falling under transfer guidelines); see also discussion supra Part I.B. for an
elaboration of the guidelines of these transfer provisions.

224. Id.
225. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(2) (1996) (allowing the prosecutor to
designate EJJP of presumptive transfer children without judicial
consideration of best interest/public safety factors).
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EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTION DESIGNATION
SERVES THE
CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS AND THE SAFETY OF THE
6
22

PUBLIC.
(B) THE COURT MAY DESIGNATE EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE
PROSECUTION
INSTITUTED

OF ANY MINOR AGAINST WHOM THE
PRESUMPTIVE
OR
DISCRETIONARY

STATE HAS
TRANSFER

PROCEEDINGS IF THE COURT, AFTER A HEARING, DETERMINES THAT
THIS DESIGNATION SERVES THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS AND THE
SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. 27
(C) WHEN MAKING A DETERMINATION UNDER THIS SECTION BASED
UPON THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS AND THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC,
THE COURT SHALL CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:
(1)THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE, INCLUDING
THE
22
8
LEVEL OF AGGRESSION OR PREMEDITATION INVOLVED;
(2)THE
2

MINOR'S

AGE,

BACKGROUND,

AND

SOPHISTICATION

LEVEL; 2
(3) THE MINOR'S RECORD OF DELINQUENCY AND2 PRIOR
11
RESPONSES TO TRADITIONAL JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATION;
(4)

THE ADEQUACY AND AVAILABILITY OF JUVENILE COURT

RESOURCES FOR EFFECTIVELY TREATING THE MINOR; 2 31 AND
(5) THE MINOR'S WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN REHABILITATIVE
EFFORTS AS
DEMONSTRATED BY THE MINOR'S PAST AND PRESENT
22
3
CONDUCT.
(D) ANY DESIGNATION UNDER THIS SECTION IS SUBJECT TO A FINDING
OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 233

A DESIGNATION HEARING SHALL BE HELD

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE FILING OF THE STATE'S DESIGNATION OR
TRANSFER MOTION." THE MINOR SHALL BE ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND

226. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(3) (1996) (allowing discretionary EJJP
judicial designation after the court considers public safety factors).
227. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(1) (1996) (giving the court the power to
order EJJP designation of children after a failed transfer attempt); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(c) (1997) (allowing a court to designate EJJP rather
than transfer after a transfer hearing).
228. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1996) (providing this safety factor in
discretionary transfer decisions); see also MINN. Juv. CT. PROC. R. 19.05
(1996) (providing for this factor in EJJP decisions).
229. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1996) (providing for consideration of
the child's age and background in discretionary transfer decisions); see also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1606 (providing for a consideration of a child's
sophistication in transfer and EJJP hearings).
230. See MINN. JUV. CT. PROC. R. 19.05 (1996) (providing for a consideration
of this factor in EJJP decisions).
231. See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1996) (providing this safety factor in
discretionary transfer decisions); see also MINN. Juv. CT. PROC. R. 19.05
(1996) (providing this factor in EJJP decisions).
232. See MINN. JUV. CT. PROC. R. 19.05 (1996) (providing a consideration of
this factor in EJJP designation decisions).
233. See S. 363, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997-98) (proposing this
requirement for any EJJP designation).
234. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(2) (1996) (providing a designation hearing
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This provision establishes two methods of EJJP designation.
These methods provide flexibility, allowing designation of children
who are not appropriate for either criminal prosecution or
traditional juvenile court adjudication. Importantly, this provision
extends EJJP to include children who would otherwise face
automatic transfer."6 The juvenile system might yet be able to
rehabilitate some of these children.3 7
Structured with the
realization that automatically consigning these children into the
criminal justice system will only increase crime, this provision
gives the prosecutor the power to choose EJJP over transfer for
those children in this category who demonstrate an amenability to
treatment.238
The creation of a second method of EJJP designation through
the direction of the juvenile court pursuant to a presumptive or
discretionary transfer hearing eliminates the necessity of forcing
the court to make an "either/or" decision resulting in exclusive
designation in every case.239 Some children standing before the
court in a discretionary or presumptive transfer hearing will
demonstrate that transfer is not proper. However, many of these
children are not able to succeed under traditional juvenile court
adjudication. This provision will ensure these children do not fall
through the cracks.
To guard against the improper designation of EJJP in
borderline cases, this provision prescribes a list of factors
determinative of the child's best interests and the safety of the
public that the court must examine prior to an EJJP designation. 4 °
However, when the child is not in such a borderline position due to
the serious nature of the offense charged, there arises an
irrebuttable presumption that, upon a finding of probable cause,
the child should face EJJP. Therefore, once the state's attorney
files a motion requesting EJJP designation of children who fall
under the guidelines of presumptive, mandatory, or automatic
within 30 days of the filing of the state's motion to designate); see also ILL. S.
363 (proposing a designation hearing within 30 days of the filing of the state's
motion to designate).
235. See ILL. S. 363 (proposing notice rights under these circumstances).
236. This would require amending 705 ILCS 405/5-4 to allow EJJP
designation of children whom the state is presently statutorily required under
automatic transfer guidelines to exclude from juvenile court jurisdiction.
237. See discussion supra Part II.B.
238. See discussion supra Part II.B.
239. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1) (1996) (providing for EJJP designation
through transfer hearings); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1997)
(providing for EJJP designation through transfer hearings); Lemov, supra
note 74, at 54 (quoting Minnesota Senator Patrick McGowan as stating that
states do not have to make this "either/or" decision).
240. See MINN. JUV. CT. PROC. R. 19.05 (1996) (providing a list of factors
the court must consider before making a discretionary EJJP designation).
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transfer, the court must order EJJP designation upon a finding of
probable cause.
B. Proposed 705 ILCS 405/5-4.5(2) EJJPTrial and Sentencing
(A) A MINOR WHOM THE STATE PROSECUTES UNDER THIS SECTION
RIGHTS AFFORDED TO
SHALL BE ENTITLED TO THE SAME DUE PROCESS
4
DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL COURT.'
(B) UPON A PLEA OR FINDING OF GUILT, THE COURT SHALL IMPOSE:
(1) A JUVENILE DISPOSITION UNDER 705 ILCS 405/5-23; AND
(2) A SENTENCE UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961.242 THE
COURT SHALL STAY THE ADULT SENTENCE PENDING THE MINOR'S
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE JUVENILE DISPOSITION, AT WHICH
TIME THE COURT SHALL VACATE THE ADULT SENTENCE 243
.
(C) UPON A PLEA OR FINDING OF GUILT FOR AN OFFENSE NOT
INCLUDED
UNDER THE
EXTENDED JURISDICTION
JUVENILE
PROSECUTION DESIGNATION, THE COURT MAY SENTENCE THE MINOR
UNDER THIS SECTION IF THE MINOR CONSENTS. 2 4 ABSENT SUCH
CONSENT, THE COURT MUST GIVE THE MINOR A JUVENILE
DISPOSITION UNDER 705 ILCS 405/5-23.242
(D) WARDSHIP OVER A MINOR WHOM THE COURT SENTENCES UNDER
THIS SECTION MAY EXTEND UNTIL THE MINOR'S TWENTY-FOURTH
246
BIRTHDAY.
(E) IF THE STATE ALLEGES THAT A MINOR WHOM THE COURT HAS
SENTENCED UNDER THIS SECTION HAS VIOLATED A CONDITION OF THE
MINOR'S JUVENILE DISPOSITION OR HAS COMMITTED A NEW OFFENSE,
THE COURT MAY ORDER THE PLACEMENT OF THE MINOR INTO
CUSTODY. 247
THE COURT SHALL PROVIDE THE MINOR AND THE
248
MINOR'S ATTORNEY WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE STATE'S ALLEGATIONS.

241. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(3) (1996) (providing the right to jury trial
and effective assistance of counsel in EJJP trials); see also S. 69, 77th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997) (amending Kansas law to provide all procedural rights
to an EJJP defendant).
242. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(4) (1996) (providing for dual sentencing
under EJJP); see also ILL. S. 363 (proposing dual sentencing under EJJP in
Illinois). 705 ILCS 405/5-23 provides juvenile dispositions pursuant to a
delinquency adjudication. 705 ILCS 405/5-23 (West 1996).
243. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(4)(2) (1996) (staying the adult sentence); see
also ILL. S. 363 (staying the adult sentence).
244. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(4) (1996) (providing a similar measure).
This provision is meant to facilitate plea-bargaining in appropriate instances,
whereby the state dismisses the charge for the EJJP-covered offense in return
for the child pleading guilty to a lesser, non-covered offense and consenting to
dual sentencing. See Case Study, supra note 118, at 1046 (discussing how
Minnesota's similar statute works).
245. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(4) (1996) (providing a similar measure).
246. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-205(3) (1997) (extending wardship over
EJJP youth until age 25).
247. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(5) (1996) (providing a similar measure).
248. Id.
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THE COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF
THESE ALLEGATIONS, AT WHICH TIME THE STATE MUST PROVE ITS
ALLEGATIONS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.24 AT THIS
HEARING THE MINOR AND THE MINOR'S ATTORNEY MAY SUBMIT
EVIDENCE CONTESTING THE STATE'S ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE OF
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 250 IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
STATE HAS PROVEN ITS ALLEGATIONS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE, THE COURT MAY ORDER IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE
ADULT SENTENCE. 251 THE COURT MAY CONTINUE THE STAY UPON THE
ADULT SENTENCE IF THE COURT FINDS MITIGATING FACTORS JUSTIFY
THIS CONTINUATION. 252 THIS FINDING SHALL BE MADE IN WRITING
AND SHALL PROVIDE A DETAILED
EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS
253
UNDERLYING THE CONTINUATION.

This provision provides full procedural rights and dual
sentencing for EJJP youth. Notably, it gives the juvenile court
discretion in dealing with EJJP-convicted youth who re-offend or
break a dispositional term.254 The goal of EJJP is to offer serious
child offenders one last chance at rehabilitation while meting out
adult punishment to those who waste this chance. 5 This goal is
not advanced when a child has diligently and actively engaged
himself or herself in the treatment program, but perhaps
inadvertently or even negligently has broken a dispositional term
or has committed a relatively minor infraction resulting in
mandatory implementation of the adult sentence.256 This provision
furthers the goal of EJJP by giving the court the option of
imposing the adult sentence or continuing the stay. 257 To prevent
249. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605(2) (1997) (providing for a revocation
hearing in which the state must prove its allegations by a preponderance of
the evidence).
250. See id. (providing this right to EJJP youth in a revocation hearing).
251. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c(e) (1997) (giving the court discretion
in deciding whether to order execution of the adult sentence).
252. See id. (allowing the court to continue the stay upon a consideration of
mitigating factors).
253. See id. (requiring written findings when the court does not order
execution of the adult sentence).
254. In his amendatory veto of ILL. S. 363, Governor James Edgar suggested
that juvenile court judges should have discretion in revoking the stay or
maintaining the stay of the adult sentence for EJJP-designated children who
violate a dispositional term. Telephone Interview with Randall Roberts,
Supervisor of the Delinquency Division, Office of the State's Attorney,
Juvenile Justice Bureau (Apr. 27, 1998).
255. Case Study, supra note 118, at 1041.
256. See id. at 1047 (describing the apprehension of some Minnesota task
force members that requiring implementation of the adult sentence for
"technical violations or trivial offenses" would be too "rigid").
257. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c(e) (1997) (giving the court this
option); see also MINN. STAT. § 260.126(5) (1996) (giving the court this option
for children whom the prosecutor has designated); MINN. R. CRIM. PROC.
27.04(3)(3)(b) (1996) (giving the court this option for all EJJP youth).
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"one last chance" from developing into many last chances, this
provision requires the court to make written findings regarding
decisions continuing the stay.25 8 Therefore, this provision furthers
the goal 259of EJJP without compromising the integrity of the
program.
This provision also extends juvenile court wardship over
EJJP-designated youth from the current maximum age of twentyone to twenty-four.2 6
Extending wardship in this manner will
serve several functions. First, it will give these youths more time
to access rehabilitative services. 211 Providing a solid three years
more of services will increase the likelihood these youths have
achieved rehabilitation and are ready to re-enter society. Second,
extending wardship will provide more accountability. The older
EJJP youth, knowing that he or she will face criminal
incarceration, will be unlikely to commit another offense during
these extra years of oversight. Research demonstrates that as
delinquent youths get older, they commit far fewer offenses or stop
committing offenses altogether. Thus, this additional oversight
will bridge the gap and guide these youths until they have
matured.
Finally, extending wardship will encourage the
utilization of EJJP rather than transfer for older, yet treatable,
children. 62 Understandably, judges might be reluctant to order
EJJP of an older child if they think any resulting sentence will be
inadequately short, even if the child is otherwise appropriate for
EJJP.' 6 Extending wardship will alleviate these concerns and
allow judges to designate EJJP for older children when
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Juvenile delinquency has long been a problem in American
society. America has responded in accordance with its changing
258. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133c(e) (1997) (requiring the court to make
written findings when declining to implement the adult sentence of a reoffending or term-breaking youth); see also MINN. STAT. § 260.126(5) (1996)

(requiring the court to make written findings when declining to revoke the
stay of youths whom the prosecutor has designated for EJJP); Case Study,
supra note 118, at 1049 (describing this requirement as a means of preventing
"one last chance" from developing into more last chances).
259. See Case Study, supra note 118, at 1049 (describing this requirement of

written findings as a way to preserve the meaningfulness of EJJP).
260. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-205(3) (1997) (providing for juvenile court
wardship over EJJP youth until age 25).

261. See discussion supra Part II.A.
262. See Case Study, supra note 118, at 1040 (stating that prolonging

wardship will alleviate the perceived need to transfer older youths).
263. See id. (describing the short period for wardship over older youths as a

motivating factor in transfer decisions).
264, See id. (stating that prolonging wardship will address judicial concerns

leading to the use of transfer for older youths).
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perceptions of children. The latest change reflected in some states
is EJJP, a system in which certain child offenders receive both a
juvenile disposition and a stayed adult sentence. EJJP recognizes
that neither the juvenile justice system nor the criminal justice
system have been successful in addressing the complex problem of
youth crime. EJJP combines the most effective elements of each
system, rehabilitating young offenders by holding them
accountable.
Illinois should fully utilize EJJP in its struggle to eradicate
youth crime. This is a struggle Illinois cannot afford to lose. The
model statute provided in this Comment will make sure that
children like Laura are not automatically lost in the criminal
justice system, and that children like Frank do not continue to
take advantage of the juvenile justice system with impunity.

